Empirical studies show that government ideology has hardly influenced welfare expenditures since the 1990s, casting doubt on the general ability of national governments to design economic policies according to their programmatic appeals. This study takes a comprehensive view on policy-making by using a modified version of the Fraser institute's Economic Freedom of the World Index: I focus on the aspects of economic freedom that provoke party polarization and that national governments are capable to influence. The results suggest that government ideology still matters in the early 21st century: The empirical analysis of 36 OECD or new European Union member states from 2000 to 2012 shows that left-wing governments are associated with significantly lower economic freedom. Economic freedom continues to be the guiding principle that divides left and right in economic policy-making because the left still promotes relatively higher levels of far-reaching government spending and regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic policies have always received a great deallot of public and scientific attention.
Intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and citizens frequently disagree about the desired size and scope of government. The dispute on economic policies is often reflected by party polarizationbased on different ideological convictions that party competition often reflects: : Left-wing parties prefer an activist state which would aim to rectifythat reduces economic inequality through regulation and redistributive policies. Right-wing parties, byin contrast, advocate a free-market economy with restrictions on state intervention to avoid market distortions.
But the established polarization between left and right on economic policies has recently been called into question. Rodrik (2011) argues that government ideology retreats to the background because of external constraints such as globalization, which would subordinate democratic governance. Iversen and Soskice (2015) disagree, maintaining that national governments still have the authority to shape their economies on predictable partisan lines, but the declining class cleavage forces them to adoapt their policy stances in order to appeal to a wider audience.
In the OECD, Tthe empirical evidence is mixed in the OECD. Some studies show that the partisan effect disappears for some areas, particularly for welfare spending (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; Potrafke 2009; Kwon and Pontusson 2010; Herwartz and Theilen 2014) , while it remains strong significant for market regulation and privatization (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2008; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Potrafke 2010a; Obinger et al. 2014) .
The previous studies have mostly focused on selected areas of economic policy-making in order to reach their conclusions on the influence of government ideology. I use the Fraser institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index to provide a unified measurement for many aspects of economic policies.
The EFW Index measures a country's economic freedom for 42 variables, which are combined to form five distinct policy areas (Gwartney et al. 2014) . In order to study the influence of government ideology, I only include those policy areas in the index that provoke partisan disagreement and that are controlled by the national government. The result is a modified EFW Index that consists of all policy-areas for which political economists discuss the 2 role of government partisanship: Government expenditures, transfers, subsidies, privatization, government investment, income and payroll tax policies, and the regulation of labor and business.
Based on theis modified EFW Index, this studyI wants to investigate the following question:
Are left-wing governments more active in restricting economic freedom?
The empirical analysis is based on aA time-series cross-sectional analysis for 36 OECD or new European Union member states during over the period of 2000-to 2012. The findings suggest shows that government partisanship still plays an important role in designing economic policies: Left-wing governments are significantly more likely than right-wing administrations to restrict economic freedom than right-wing governments.
II. DOES GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY STILL MATTER?

II. 1. The classic partisan hypothesis
The polarization of political parties across a programmatic left-right dimension is constitutive for historical cleavage theorists and for spatial theorists of party competition (Kitschelt 2000: 846) . In both traditions, government accountability and responsiveness arise from implementing the economic policies that the public desires. If parties polarize and offer a distinctive ideological program, voters are supposed to have a clear choice at the ballot-box.
Voters could use ideologies and party labels as a shortcut to reduce information cost and may still reach rational decisions (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 1 Given the importance of partisan differences for democratic legitimacy, scholars have continuously evaluated how parties differ across the left-right continuum. Hibbs (1977) argues that left-leaning governments prefer reducing unemployment while a right-wing government would opt for price stability, assuming a politically exploitable Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Studies show that left-wing governments have expanded the scope and expenditures of the welfare state up until the 1980s (Esping-Andersen 1985; Hicks and 3 Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Hicks 1999; Iversen and Cusack 2000) . The classic partisan hypothesis suggests that a left-wing government implements expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to decrease unemployment, whereas a right-wing counterpart prefers lower inflation and implements restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.
II. 2. Government ideology in an era of austerity and globalization
The classic partisan hypothesis has come under attack by newer empirical findings. They suggest that the partisan effect on welfare expenditures has disappeared since the 1990s (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; Potrafke 2009; Kwon and Pontusson 2010; Herwartz and Theilen 2014) .
The literature provides several explanations for the disappearing partisan effect, highlighting the rise of economic constraints, such as the shift to a postindustrial economy (Iversen and Cusack 2000) , an aging population (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009) , and expanding international competition through globalization (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Rodrik 2011) .
Economic constraints would force leftist governments to refrain from further expanding the welfare state, but popular support for the existing welfare state would also restrict the efforts of right-wing governments to cut back on welfare benefits in the "era of new politics" (Pierson 1996 (Pierson , 2001 ).
But the influence of external constraints on policy-making should not be overemphasized. Globalization leads to increasedfosters international competition, economic integration and mobile capital markets, but the development has not triggered a race-to-thebottom of welfare spending, taxation, or labor market regulation (Schulze and Ursprung 1999; Dreher 2006a; Dreher et al. 2008; Plümper et al. 2009; Potrafke 2010b , Potrafke 2015 .
Different outcomes in economic policy-making can be reliably linked to government ideology in the OECD (Boix 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003) : Left-wing governments tend to enact more protective labor market regulation (Botero et al. 2004 ) and spend more on work training (Iversen and Stephens 2008) . By contrast, right-wing governments are relatively more supportive of deregulating product markets (Potrafke 2010a ) and privatization (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2008; Obinger et al. 2014). 4 External constraints have certainly affected policymaking and party competition. But it remains questionable whether they undermine governments' general ability to shape the economy according to partisan goals.
III. DRAWING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY
III. 1. Why economic freedom is a guiding principle for party competition
The previous discussion has shownsuggests that it is insufficient to focus on only one or a few aspects of policy-making in order to evaluate the partisan hypothesis. This section suggests that economic freedom is a comprehensive concept that accounts for existing partisan differences in economic policy making.
The underlying concepts of economic freedom are "(1) personal choice, (2) voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, (3) freedom to enter and compete in markets, and (4) protection of persons and their property from aggression by others" (Gwartney et al. 2014: 1) .
Economic freedom is a core principle that separates left and right on the economic dimension of party competition. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014: 1671) Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) argue that the types of preferences that drive political behavior and left-right polarization can be categorized into group (identity), grid (governance), and greed (distribution or economic policy-making). This study focuses on the left-right polarization of mainstream parties on the economic greed dimension. Whether this distinction applies for the group and grid dimensions is beyond the scope of the paper. 5 professionals in public service sector jobs have become core supporters of left-wing parties (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014) . Programmatically, the left appeals to their new constituents by promoting the provision of public sector jobs, and by emphasizing active state policies, such as government investment in education and vocational skills (Iversen and Stephens 2008; Häusermann et al. 2013: 226-8) . The left also embraces business and labor market regulations in order to address social risks that their electorate is facing. Regulatory proposals range from laws protecting full-time employees from their dismissal (Rueda 2007 ) to fostering child care facilities and parental leave policies (Häusermann 2006) . Left-wing cultural values also spill over into the economic realm as most left-wing parties support tougher employment regulation through gender quotas or anti-discrimination laws (Terjesen et al. 2015) .
These left-wing policies are hardly in accordance with the principle of economic freedom. Consequently, Even though mainstream left-wing parties have accepted or initiated some free-market reforms -such as Anthony Blair's Labour government in the UK or Gerhard Schröder's leftist red-green coalition in Germany -there should be on average be a significant reduction in economic freedom when the left governs.
III. 2. Modifying the Economic Freedom of the World Index
The EFW Index by the Fraser Institute is considered to be the gold standard to measure economic freedom (Dawson 2007: 185) . Most scholar utilize the EFW Index as the main explanatory variable to evaluate whether economic freedom can explain desirable outcomes.
For instance, they demonstrate find a positive association of economic freedom with economic development (Gwartney et al. 2006) , democratic institutions (Peev and Mueller 2012), social trust (Berggren and Jordahl 2006) , and tolerance (Berggren and Nilsson 2013) .
Only a few studies examine the influence of government ideology on economic freedom.
On the federal level, right-wing government ideology is associated with more freedom on labor markets in American and Canadian states Potrafke 2012, 2013) and with economic freedom in Western German states (Potrafke 2013) . But there is only one time-series cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between the EFW Index and government ideology: given up national monetary policy as in the case of the European Central Bank (Arnone et al. 2007 ). The delegation and conduct of monetary policy does not appear to be statistically related to partisanship (Way 2000; Gilardi 2007; Jäger 2016) . The introduction of the euro was largely supported by all mainstream parties and rather caused preference divergence between the political elite and the general public, particularly in Germany (Jäger 2013: 117-8) . Similarly, tariffs, capital controls, and travel restrictions have been abolished within the EU. Bilateral or general trade agreements often regulate the ability of administrations to impose new tariffs and restrictions. As governments cannot substantially alter economic freedom in Area 3 "Sound Money" and Area 4 "Freedom to Trade," both areas are removed from the modified EFW index.
Area 5 refers to the regulation of capital, labor and business. Governments still have the capacity to shape business and labor market regulation. An expert survey indicates that left-and right-wing parties substantially differ in their preferences regarding regulation across different sectors (Benoit and Laver 2006) . Thus, the modified EFW index includes business and labor market regulation. 8 Parties could disagree over the regulation of credit markets, but national governments have limited say in this area. The interest rate policy by the central bank and the course of the business cycle strongly patterns can influence the score for credit regulation. For instance, the Great Recession caused a drastic drop in the score for most countries -suggesting that governments can play a minor role at best in influencing the score. As a consequence, the modified EFW index does not include credit market regulation.
<<< FIGURE 1 >>>
The modified EFW Index consists of the three equally weighted areas "Size of Government", "Labor Market Regulation" and "Business Regulation" and is multiplied by 10 to range from 0 (the least economic freedom) to 100 (highest economic freedom). The inclusion of policy areas is in line with an expert survey, which finds that national governments of EU members have at least some degree of influence in economic development and planning and social/industrial policy (Hooghe and Marks 2001) . Additionally, Nanou and Dorussen (2013) confirm that the ideological distance between parties has dwindled in policy areas that are increasingly under the realm of the EU. 
IV. 2. Model specification and empirical analysis
The empirical analysis is based on the following regression equation: where "∆ Modified EFW Index" measures the first differences of the modified EFW Index and is the dependent variable, while "Government Ideology" denotes the main explanatory variable.
"∑ " contains other explanatory variables as controls. The International Country
Risk Guide provides a measurement for government stability and public popularity, as governments could shy away from economic reforms if they have to face falling approval rates.
The variable "Government Stability" combines the three subcomponents government unity, legislative strength, and popular support, 8 which ranges from 0 to 12.
Moreover, effective domestic veto players can also restrict governments from enacting economic reforms (Tsebelis 1995) . Hallerberg and Basinger (1998: 339) show that a high number of veto players leads to a status quo bias in tax policies. The Political Constraints Index 5 by Henisz (2000) accounts for "Veto Players" within the executive, two legislative chambers, the federal level, and the judiciary. "Veto Players" potentially ranges from 0 to 1. The dummy "Government Change" indicates whether there was a turnover in government in a given year.
"EU" denotes whether a country is a member of the European Union.
The next variables relate to external constraints. First differences of Dreher (2006b)'s KOF Index of Globalization combine social, political, and economic dimensions to provide a comprehensive measurement for globalization. And the analysis includes the first differences of the following domestic economic constraints: real GDP per capita in thousand US$, unemployment rate, national debt, as drawn from the World Bank Global Development Indicators. Additionally, the level of the EFW Index at t-1 is used as a control variable to capture converging trends. Table 2 depicts shows the descriptive statistics of all variables and their first differences.
<<< TABLE 2 >>>
" " denotes country fixed effects to control for country-specific time-invariant effects, such as national culture, federalism, the electoral or monetary systems; " " represents annual time effects to adjust for common positive or negative shocks; " " is the error term. The model specification is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors because the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
It is possible, however, that government ideology has a time-delayed effect on economic freedom, and that some explanatory variables, such as GDP per capita or unemployment, might be affected by economic freedom. As a consequence, all explanatory variables are lagged by t-1 one year in additional model specifications in order to tackle potential time-lags and reverse causality issues. The second and third models add the other explanatory variables and the lagged level of economic freedom as controls. Models 4-6 re-examine the previous specifications with lagging the explanatory variables by t+1 one year to tackle potential endogeneity problems. Government
<<< TABLE 3 >>>
Ideology has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in columns (1), (2), (3), and (6), at the 95 percent confidence level in column (4), and at the 90 percent confidence level in column (5), indicating that left-wing governments are significantly more likely to restrict economic freedom. 9
9 The appendix also confirms the empirical results of Table 3 with dependent and continuous explanatory variables in levels based on a general least squares Prais-Winsten transformation with a first order autoregressive process
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The significant negative coefficient for the lagged level of economic freedom suggests that countries with already high levels of economic freedom are associated with negative changes. Among the other variables measuring various constraints on government, none significantly affects economic freedom in all models; there is some evidence that EU membership has a positive influence on economic freedom when not controlling for the previous EFW level. Government Stability only appears to be conducive for economic freedom Table 3 to draw 1000 sets of simulated coefficients from each posterior distribution to account for estimation uncertainty (Tomz et al. 2003) . Government Ideology is set at one of its five values while all other explanatory variables are fixed at their means, yielding five counterfactual scenarios for the numerical effect of hegemonic right, dominant right, balanced, dominant left, and hegemonic left governments on the first differences of economic freedom. Figure 3 plots the density estimates for the five counterfactual scenarios over the first differences of economic freedom. As government ideology becomes more left-wing, the density estimates move to the left, indicating that left-wing governments tend to reduce economic (AR1), which accounts for the serial correlation of the dependent variable. The Prais-Winsten transformation provides a robustness test for the long-term effects of government ideology on economic freedom (Plümper et al. 2005: 349) . Additional tests show that Government Ideology is not conditional on other factors, such as the age of the government, government stability, or veto players, across all model specifications. An interaction term between Government Ideology and age of government is significantly positive at the 95 percent confidence interval for the model specifications of columns (4) and (5); an interaction term between Government Ideology and veto players is significantly negative at the 95 percent confidence interval for column (5).
<<< FIGURE 3 >>>
14 freedom. On average, hegemonic left-wing governments reduce the first differences of economic freedom by 0.30 points, and its the density estimate is relatively steeper than the other distributions, which suggests that the outcome variation among hegemonic left-wing governments in changing economic freedom is relatively larger. The average increases in first differences of economic freedom is are 0.04 for dominant left governments, 0.39 for balanced governments, 0.74 for dominant right governments, and 1.08 for hegemonic right governments.
Thus, the average simulated difference between hegemonic left and right governments is about 1.38 points of the annual changes in economic freedom. As the density estimates for hegemonic left and right governments are not overlapping, we can confirm this numerical difference with a high degree of certainty (King et al. 2000: 357) .
<<< TABLE 4 >>>
In order to evaluate whether a group of countries drives the significant results of Government Ideology, Table 4 divides the data into several subsamples based on membership in the Eurozone, and on electoral system. Eurozone membership might be another constraint thwarting government ideology (Crum 2013) , as southern Eurozone members, in particular, have limited capacities to fulfill their electoral promises since the advent of the euro crisis (Crum 2013) .. In the case of the electoral system the dominance of government ideology might be stronger in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Lithuania, UK and USA, because countries with plurality formulas tend to produce two-party systems with one governing party. The proportional rules of the other countries, in contrast, tend to lead to multi-party systems with coalition governments coalitions. Table 4 shows that the coefficient for Government Ideology stays significant in all subsamples with contemporaneous and lagged explanatory variables. The findings of Table 4 suggest that a cluster of countries does not drive the negative association between left-wing government and economic freedom.
As another robustness test, Table 5 (1/4); Models 3-4: Size of Government (4/6 to account for each of its four subareas), Business
Regulation (1/6) and Labor Regulation (1/6).
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Models 5-6 are based on the original EFW Index. Using the first differences of the original EFW Index as dependent variable is a strong robustness test for the validity of the partisan hypothesis because national governments have only limited or no authority to directly influence the remaining policy areas of the EFW Index. These previously excluded areas account for 2/3 of the weighting of the original EFW Index. Table 5 shows that Government Ideology remains significantly negative in the first four model specifications. The results indicate that the negative relationship between left-wing partisanship and economic freedom is robust for weighting changes in the composition of the modified EFW Index. While the coefficient for Government Ideology shrinks in Models 5 and 6, the coefficient remains significant at the 99 and 90 percent confidence level.
Overall, the robustness tests tend to confirm the continuing influence of government ideology on economic policy-making.
<<< TABLE 5 >>>
V. CONCLUSION
The influence of government ideology on economic policies remains vitally important for democratic legitimacy and government accountability, leading to recurring interest on in how government ideology leaves its programmatic footprint in the economy.
In the "Golden Age" of the welfare state,N national governments had the sovereignty and fiscal capacity to shape monetary and welfare policies according to their ideological Simulated effects of Government Ideology on first differences in economic freedom 30 Table 5 Robustness tests -using first differences of other economic freedom indices as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Government Ideology
